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Abstract 
Foresight can be a highly useful tool to address the opportunities and challenges triggered by 
the next production revolution. As shown by the various country cases considered in this 
chapter, it facilitates debating and systemic thinking about multiple futures and helps shaping 
the future through the process of participation and engagement. Given its participatory nature, 
key actors are mobilised to form shared views about the future, negotiate their future stakes and 
interests, and agree on actions aligned to their shared vision. The next production revolution 
requires quick and proactive policy-making, as well as better orchestration across different 
policy domains. Foresight can assist policy-makers by providing foundations for robust policies, 
fostering new framing of policy issues, as well as translating long-term concerns into aligned 
policy priorities. Furthermore, policy implementation is likely to be faster and more effective 
when key stakeholders are involved early on in shaping these policies. Foresight benefits, 
however, are far from being automatic: the chapter considers eight factors critical to achieving 
those. An astute embedding of a foresight process into policy-making enhances the likelihood of 
impact, but foresight recommendations are no substitute for policy decisions and actions. 
 
published in: OECD (ed.): The Next Production Revolution: Implications for governments and 
business, Paris: OECD, pp. 299-324, DOI: 10.1787/9789264271036-en 
 
 
1 Introduction1 
Day-to-day decisions, taken either by policy-makers or the leaders of various private and 
societal organisations, guided by long-term, strategic thinking tend to lead to more targeted – 
ideally also more favourable – outcomes than ad hoc decisions. While there are a variety of 
approaches to strategic thinking, those that rely on foresight tend to be more robust because 
they cover a broad spectrum of possible long-term futures as inputs to strategy development. 
This applies a fortiori to those decisions that seek to position a country, a region or a firm amidst 
the turbulence caused by the next production revolution. 
Of various types of prospective analyses, this chapter focuses on foresight because this is a 
particularly relevant policy approach to address the opportunities and challenges triggered by 
the next production revolution: besides facilitating debate and systemic thinking about possible 
futures, foresight also helps shape the future. A well-designed and conducted foresight process 
identifies and assesses in a systematic and transparent way those societal, technological, 
economic, environmental, and policy factors and trends that are likely to affect competitiveness, 
wealth creation and quality of life. Such analysis can be used by policy-makers as inputs for issue 
definition, as well as for designing policies. It can help turn long-term concerns into urgent 
policy priorities. At the same time, foresight can raise awareness and understanding of such 
factors among the stakeholders involved in the process, mobilising them to act and preparing 
the ground for complementary actions and strategies. In this way, foresight can contribute to the 
emergence of more coherent expectations and strategies, making policy implementation more 
effective. By exploring multiple futures (as opposed to a single future) and by bringing together 
 
1 We are grateful for the guidance provided by Michael Keenan and Alistair Nolan when designing the 
structure of this chapter, as well as for the constructive and thorough comments and suggestions to 
improve the first draft. 
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major stakeholders with diverse backgrounds, foresight can help decision-makers cope with an 
uncertain future and provide the foundations for more robust policy-making. 
This is highly pertinent in the context of the next production revolution. The fast and 
interconnected changes in technologies, materials, processes and business models have major 
implications for the strategies of many different types of innovation and societal actor. There is a 
strong need for co-ordination among these actors in order, for instance, to set standards for 
interoperability, security and privacy, or to develop appropriate curricula and education 
methods for skills development. These are just a few of the necessary actions to prepare for the 
future opportunities and challenges of the next production revolution. 
To reap the benefits of foresight, policy needs to be receptive to the processes that foresight 
requires and its policy implications. Ideally, foresight should be institutionalised, with regular 
rounds of foresight supported by continuous horizon scanning. A fundamental condition for 
achieving impact is to have a committed policy client. Foresight should be embedded in the 
decision-making system. A suitable choice of timing, relevance to major policy issues, and co-
ordination with other policy initiatives are all critical. It is also crucial to find an organisational 
set-up that eases the inherent contradiction between the need for foresight work to be close to 
decision-making processes (to achieve impact), and the need to maintain intellectual autonomy 
(to generate original ideas and out-of-the-box thinking). Any solution to this perennial tension 
can only be context-specific. 
The next section briefly reviews the most important types of prospective analysis and their 
policy relevance in the context of the next production revolution. The potential benefits of 
foresight and its roles in shaping policies are then discussed, again in comparison with other 
types of forward-looking analysis. Before summarising the main policy and organisational 
lessons, several factors are highlighted to help policy-makers maximise the benefits of foresight. 
 
 
2 Foresight and its policy relevance 
2.1 Locating foresight among prospective analytical tools 
Prospective analyses can be conducted in various forms and pursue different purposes. The 
best-known forms include forecasting, critical (or key) technologies exercises, foresight, 
strategic planning in the private sector and indicative national planning. This chapter focuses on 
foresight, but to better understand its policy relevance – what can and cannot be expected from 
foresight – it is worth briefly juxtaposing foresight with other types of prospective analysis, in 
particular forecasting and expert-based (non-participatory) prospective analysis. First, two 
fundamentally different systematic approaches to the future are considered: forecasting and 
foresight.2 Forecasters assume that the future is essentially determined by fairly stable 
structural and institutional settings, the main features of which can be called driving forces. The 
main task is thus to identify these driving forces, devise a reliable quantitative model, collect the 
relevant data and run simulations to generate future extrapolations at given points in time. 
Experts need to be involved in developing these future extrapolations, which may differ from 
each other quantitatively, but not structurally (that is, the same variables are used throughout, 
even if their values change from forecast to forecast). Forecasting can be used either for pure 
academic exercises or as a decision-preparatory tool both in the public and private sector. 
Foresight processes, in contrast, are based on the assumption that the future can be shaped by 
deliberate present-day actions: at least some unfavourable trends can be altered (redirected, 
slowed down, or stopped altogether) to some extent and new, desirable ones can be set in 
motion as a result of private and public actions. Foresight, therefore, explores different possible 
 
2 Major differences of foresight and expert-based (non-participatory) prospective analysis in relation to 
tackling next production revolution issues are discussed in the next section (2.2). 
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futures. In uncertain times, thinking in terms of multiple futures is a necessary precondition for 
devising strategies to cope with unexpected developments. To realise foresight’s potential to shape the future, major stakeholders need to be involved not 
only to identify, but also to assess, the major (current, emerging and future) trends, consider a 
set of feasible futures, and select the most favourable one. In this way, values and interests play a 
decisive role in foresight processes, and thus it is crucial to make the entire process inclusive 
and transparent. With the help of participatory methods, foresight can incorporate different 
perspectives when exploring possible futures and bring to the fore a range of relevant influences 
and impacts of the issues in question. The process itself can have systemic impacts: due to 
intense dialogue, existing networks of major actors are likely to be strengthened, new ones 
created, a future-oriented way of thinking reinforced. The novel, participatory methods also 
reshape the overall decision-making culture in the affected policy domain. 
Furthermore, most foresight activities aim at achieving a common understanding of what a 
desirable future might be. Such visions and – associated with them – more operational roadmaps 
can be powerful instruments to assemble different key players around a shared agenda. The 
main benefit of such visions, roadmaps and strategic agendas is that they help reduce 
uncertainty about the ambitions of partners and competitors, and thus assist long-term 
decision-making. Moreover, once participants arrive at a shared vision, they can expect that 
most of their fellow participants will take steps to achieve that chosen future state, and thus 
align their future actions to the jointly identified favourable future. 
Foresight needs to be clearly distinguished from the strategies it is supposed to feed. In the 
context of the next production revolution, the German Industrie 4.0 initiative may serve as an 
example of a strategy, which was inspired at least partly by prior foresight activities in Germany. 
The next production revolution is likely to trigger complex changes given the interactions of new 
technologies (such as 3D printing and scanning, the Internet of Things, machine-to-machine 
(M2M) and person-to-machine (P2M) communications and interactions, and advanced 
robotics); new materials (in particular bio- and nano-based materials); new processes (for 
example, data-driven production, artificial intelligence and synthetic biology); as well as new 
business models (exploiting mass customisation, sharing and the platform economy, and 
servitisation of manufacturing) (OECD, 2016a, 2016b). These changes would affect research, 
technological development and innovation activities (direction of search, allocation of funds, 
commercialisation, ethical concerns); the labour market (via job creation and job destruction); 
income distribution and well-being; skill requirements (and thus formal training via the 
education system, retraining, life-long learning); and, several fields of regulation (for instance 
intellectual property rights (IPR), privacy, security and safety investment). Furthermore, 
digitalisation can be a major enabler of the circular economy (for instance, via mass 
customisation, smart logistics, smart cities, and smart homes). The policy implications of the 
next production revolution are so wide-ranging that it would be difficult to mention a major 
policy domain, which will be untouched by the sorts of sweeping changes noted above. 
The need for policy orchestration is, therefore, rather strong. Foresight would assist policy-
makers in dealing with these complex changes and challenges in three ways.3 First, it would 
facilitate a systemic approach, consider multiple futures and draw on the diverse set of 
knowledge and experience of participants. Furthermore, a strong sense of ownership among 
participants could work as an additional factor to keep up the momentum of orchestrated policy 
design and implementation. Second, the next production revolution is likely to increase 
uncertainty. Yet, a shared vision, developed – and thus “owned” – by the major stakeholders 
 
3 Foresight can also assist decision-makers in the private sector at firm and sectoral level, for instance in 
tackling changes induced by the next production revolution in investment opportunities; co-ordinating 
technological, organisational, business model, financial, managerial and marketing innovations; as well as 
re-organising and co-ordinating international innovation and production networks. 
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participating in a foresight process, can reduce uncertainty. Third, the next production 
revolution is also likely to induce systemic changes, for instance, in the form of emerging 
innovation ecosystems or radically overhauled national, sectoral or regional innovation systems. 
A transformative foresight process, aimed at considering and assisting these systemic changes, 
can contribute to reshaping the prevailing power structures (which might constrain the desired 
changes) and rejuvenating policy rationales, the overall decision-making culture and methods, 
and thus the efficacy and efficiency of policies. 
Both forecasting exercises and foresight processes rely on a rich arsenal of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, including simulation, extrapolation, Delphi surveys, horizon scanning, 
PESTLE (political, economic, social [socio-cultural], technological, legal and environmental) and 
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, as well as scenario 
development (Box 1). Several of these methods are widely used as part of day-to-day decision-
preparatory processes, for example, simulation, horizon scanning, SWOT and scenario analysis. 
A given foresight process relies on a bespoke set of tools and methods to identify and assess in a 
systematic and transparent way those societal, technological, economic, environmental and 
policy factors and trends that are likely to affect competitiveness, wealth creation and quality of 
life. 
 
Box 1: Selected methods for prospective analyses 
STEEPV and PESTLE analyses provide a simple guiding and structuring framework to identify major 
driving forces and trends. STEEPV stands for social, technological, economic, environmental, political, and 
value-driven factors and trends, while PESTLE, is a shorthand for political, economic, social [socio-
cultural], technological, legal, and environmental ones. SWOT analysis is used to identify and categorise 
significant internal (strengths and weaknesses) and external (opportunities and threats) factors faced by 
an organisation, a city, a region, a nation or a world region. 
Horizon scanning is aimed at detecting early signs of potentially important developments. These can be 
weak (or early) signals, trends, wild cards or other developments, persistent problems, risks and threats, 
including matters at the margins of current thinking that challenge past assumptions. It can be completely 
explorative or a limited search for information in a specific field defined by the objectives of a given task. 
It seeks to determine what is likely to be constant, what may change and what is constantly changing in 
the chosen time horizon (short-, medium- or long-term). 
Trend extrapolation first identifies a trend that is apparent over time and then projects it forward based 
on data concerning the rates of change. In shorter-term forecasts a linear or exponential curve (e.g. 
economic growth, or diffusion of a technology) is extended. To use extrapolation in the longer-term, one 
should be confident that the underlying driving forces would persist. Using merely quantitative methods, 
it cannot be assessed if and when ceilings or turning points would be reached. 
Simulation creates and experiments with a computerised mathematical model imitating the behaviour of 
a real-world process or system over time. Simulation is used to describe and analyse the behaviour of a system by asking “what-if” questions about the real system. In this way, it can assist in the design of real 
systems. 
A Delphi survey is an expert survey conducted in two or more rounds. In the second and later rounds of 
the survey, results of the previous round are made available for the respondents to consider. From the 
second round on, therefore, the respondents are aware of their colleagues' opinions when they give their 
answers. Giving this type of feedback differentiates Delphi from ordinary opinion surveys. The underlying 
idea is that the respondents can learn from the views of others, without being unduly influenced by people 
who talk the loudest at meetings, or who have the highest prestige, etc. Ideally, significant dissenters from 
an evolving consensus are required to explain the reasons for their views, and this would serve as useful 
intelligence for others. 
A possible set of future situations can be described and discussed at different lengths and for somewhat different purposes in “visions”, “futures” and “fully-fledged scenarios”. These are, therefore, interrelated 
terms, but not synonyms. 
A vision is a rather short description (a single paragraph) of a desired future in order to unite and 
mobilise people to accomplish what is stated in that particular vision statement. 
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A future is a detailed description of a particular situation (outcome of important developments with its 
major features and interrelationships) in the future. Compared to a vision, it is more detailed, analytical, 
and neutral. Put succinctly, a vision is normative, while a future is descriptive (a tool for exploration). 
A fully-fledged scenario (or path scenario) contains a future, as well as the path leading to that future, 
that is, the major decisions and steps to be taken to reach that particular future. 
To be effective, visions, futures and fully-fledged scenarios must be plausible, consistent and offer insights 
into the future. They should be structurally different, that is, they should not be so close to one another 
that they become simply variations of a base case. They can draw on many different sources and methods, 
potentially including all those listed above, as well as brainstorming and specifically designed scenario-
building workshops. In contrast to simulation, futures and fully-fledged scenarios can explore 
relationships and trends for which little or no numerical data are available, including shocks and 
discontinuities; they can more easily incorporate motivations, values, and behaviour; and they can create 
images that capture the imagination of those for whom they are intended. They can help decision-makers 
think about the future in a systematic way by considering a range of plausible futures. These tools also 
help stimulate creativity and break away from the conventional obsession with present and short-term 
problems. 
A critical (key) technologies study aims to identify short-term (three-ten years) research and 
development policy priorities. Its decisive feature is the set of criteria against which the criticality (the 
importance) of particular technologies are assessed. It is based on interviews with experts and in some 
cases on a benchmarking analysis with a selected country or region. 
Sources and further readings: Cuhls et al. (2015); the FOREN Guide (Gavigan et al. (eds), 2001); 
the FOR-LEARN Online Foresight Guide (http://www.foresight-platform.eu/community/forlearn) 
 
Depending on the methodological approach taken, foresight exercises can generate a variety of “products”, including thematic reports by panels, lists of priorities, policy recommendations, and 
roadmaps. These may be generated as intermediary products during the process or as end 
products. They are often the most visible outputs of a foresight exercise and may be extensively 
used in policy planning, including by those who may not have been directly involved in the 
foresight process. 
Foresight is practised in many domains and at different levels from sectoral, local, and regional 
levels, to national levels, and occasionally for world regions, too. Several foresight exercises have 
focused solely on manufacturing and production, including “Making Value for America: 
Embracing the Future of Manufacturing, Technology, and Work” (Donofrio and Whitefoot (eds), 
2015), “The Future of Manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK” 
(Government Office for Science (GOS), 2013), “Industry of the Future: Rallying the New Face of Industry in France” (2013), “The Future of Manufacturing in Europe 2015-2020: The challenge 
for sustainability (FutMan)” (see Geyer et al., 2003), and “Manufacturing Visions – integrating 
diverse perspectives into pan-European foresight (ManVis)” (Arilla et al., 2005). Others have 
covered numerous fields, including manufacturing, and are typically wide-ranging national 
efforts. They include the various rounds of Chinese, Finnish, German, Japanese, Korean, Russian 
and UK national foresight programmes, as well as one-off national foresight programmes, for 
example, in Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and South Africa.4 The 
large – and increasing – number of foresight programmes suggests that foresight can be a useful 
policy tool in rather dissimilar innovation systems. 
At the same time, continuous horizon scanning activities are tightly embedded in government 
organisations in several countries. The particularly relevant examples are the UK Horizon 
 
4 For detailed analyses of these country cases consult e.g. Amanatidou (2013), (2014); Cuhls (2004); 
(2013); Cuhls and Georghiou (2004); Cuhls et al. (2008); Cuhls et al. (eds) (2009d); Georghiou et al. 
(2010); Georghiou and Keenan (2006); Havas (2003), Keenan and Miles (2009); Könnölä et al. (2009); 
Kuwahara (1999); Martin and Johnston (1999); Miles (2005); NISTEP (2005); OECD (1996); Salo et al. 
(2009); Shin et al. (1999); Stanovnik and Kos (2007); and Yokoo and Okuwada (2012). 
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Scanning Programme, the Centre for Strategic Futures in Singapore, and Policy Horizons Canada, 
which has been conducting several metascan projects in recent years.  
 
2.2 Four archetypes of prospective analysis addressing next production revolution issues 
Prospective analyses can take many different forms, varying in their specific aims, thematic 
coverage, geographic scope, focus, methods and time horizons. They also vary in their breadth of 
thematic coverage (a focus on science and technology (S&T) issues versus a broader focus on 
innovation and production systems) and their breadth of participation (confined to topic experts 
versus broader participation). Combining these distinctions, four different archetypes of 
prospective analysis can be identified (Table 1). These four archetypes5 are explained in more 
detail below and illustrated by short descriptions of actual cases. 
 
Table 1: Four archetypes of prospective analyses, with selected examples 
 Breadth of thematic coverage ➔ 
S&T focus Focus on innovation and production systems 
B
r
e
a
d
th
 o
f p
a
r
tic
ip
a
tio
n
 ➔
 
Expert-based • Productive Nanosystems: A Technology 
Roadmap, (US, 2007) 
• Korean Delphi surveys (since 1994, the 
most recent one conducted in 2015-16) 
• ManVis (EU, 2003-06) 
• Making Value for America: Embracing the 
Future of Manufacturing, Technology, and 
Work (US, 2015) 
• FutMan (EU, 2001-03) 
Participatory • Exploiting the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum, (UK Foresight, 2004) 
• Nanotechnology for Podlaskie 2020 
(Poland, 2009-13) 
• FinnSight 2015 (Finland, 2006) 
• BMBF Foresight (Germany, 2007-09, 2012-
14) 
• Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (US, 
since 2011) 
• The Future of Manufacturing: A new era of 
opportunity and challenge for the UK (2013) 
• The more recent Japanese foresight 
programmes 
Source: authors’ compilation 
 
Varying breadth of participation: Expert-based projects versus participatory processes 
As highlighted above, foresight is a participatory process, but some types of prospective analysis 
can be conducted by small(er) expert teams, too. These projects can consider either a single 
future or multiple futures. In contrast to foresight processes, these are likely to be shorter, and 
thus cheaper projects, and can have more direct, more visible, and more easily identifiable 
impacts on certain policy decisions. Critical (or key) technologies exercises fall into this category 
and have been conducted, for example, in the Czech Republic (Klusacek, 2004), France – where 
the Technologies Clés exercises are carried out every five years – and the United States. Yet, 
these types of projects are unlikely to result in a shared vision, reduced uncertainties, and 
 
5 Archetypes are relevant for analytical purposes to support strategy-setting processes, but real life cases often ‘sit’ between them. Japan’s Robot Strategy (2015), for instance, has a strong S&T focus, but it also 
explicitly considers several cross-cutting issues, such as human resources, development, regulation, as 
well as the specific features of several sectors, including manufacturing; services; nursing and medical 
application fields; infrastructure, disaster response and construction; as well as various branches of agri-
food businesses. “Nanotechnology for Podlaskie 2020” also had a strong S&T focus, but regional 
networking and co-operation were major concerns, too. The US Advance Manufacturing Partnership is 
another example of combining major features of two archetypes: its reports have been produced by 
expert groups, but 1 200 participants from industry, academia and government have been involved via 
regional consultation events, and their views and suggestions are reflected in the final report of the 
project. 
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systemic impacts. In particular, it is unlikely that the overall decision-making culture would be 
altered. Neither would the viewpoints of citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
enrich policy dialogues when this policy preparation tool is used. 
Varying breadth of topic coverage: Focus on S&T developments versus focus on innovation and 
production systems 
A given prospective analysis can aim at building strategic visions to guide technological 
development efforts. For example, the UK foresight project on “Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum” (EEMS), completed in 2004, identified four rapidly developing areas in this specific 
S&T domain, which should represent major areas of economic activity for the coming 10-20 
years: all-optical data handling, manufacturing with light, electromagnetics in the near field, and 
non-intrusive imaging. An action plan was devised for each area by its own group, composed of 
people from business, academia, user communities, and government and other agencies. A five-
year review established that the EEMS project had been largely successful in identifying S&T 
areas that would be important for businesses and these were still relevant after five years. Many 
of the actions following the project had encouraged discussion of the importance of the four 
identified S&T areas, although the review found it difficult to quantify the implications of these 
activities (DTI, 2004). 
Several other projects have also had an S&T focus, including both expert-based exercises, for example, “Productive Nanosystems: A Technology Roadmap” (US, 2007; see UT-Battelle, 2007); 
the series of Delphi surveys conducted in Korea at five-year intervals since 1994; and more 
participatory projects, for example, the “National Nanotechnology Foresight Program” (Russia, 
2005; see Gaponenko, 2008) and “Nanotechnology for Podlaskie 2020” (Poland, 2009-13; see 
Kononiuk et al., 2012).6 
Other foresight projects take a more systemic view and aim to build visions for manufacturing, or, 
more generally, national, regional or sectoral innovation and production systems. For example, “The future of manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK”, a foresight 
project completed in 2013, considered a wide range of factors shaping the future of 
manufacturing by looking ahead to 2050 (see Box 2). The two-year project was a major effort: it 
produced 37 background reports, and besides mobilising the major UK stakeholders, it also 
involved some 300 industry and academic experts, business leaders and other stakeholders 
from 25 countries, via workshops organised on three continents (GOS, 2013). 
 
 
6 Given the numerous projects on information and communication technology (ICT), industrial 
biotechnology, chemicals and pharmaceuticals conducted in many different countries, we cannot even 
aspire to compile a nearly exhaustive list of these prospective analyses. 
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Box 2: The future of manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK 
Background 
 “The future of manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK” project was launched in 
2011, as part of the third cycle of UK Foresight,7 and was sponsored by the Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills. 
Process 
This two-year project was run by the Foresight Programme of the UK, under the personal direction of the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser. The Industry High Level Stakeholder Group, with 34 members from 
businesses, the government, professional associations, NGOS, and trade unions, chaired by the sponsoring 
politician, provided strategic advice. The project was overseen by a multi-disciplinary, nine-strong, Lead 
Expert Group, chaired by a chairman of a major UK company, and consisted mainly of academics. Besides 
mobilising the major UK stakeholders, the project also involved some 300 industry and academic experts, 
business leaders and other stakeholders from 25 countries, via workshops held in Asia, Europe and the 
United States, as well as using other means of consultation. 
Outputs 
The written outputs include 37 peer-reviewed technical evidence papers, a final report of 250 pages and a 
summary report of 54 pages, all made available online. The project considered several factors shaping the 
key future characteristics of manufacturing by looking ahead to 2050. These include new business models, e.g. the “servitisation” of manufacturing; the extension of value chains; major market trends and 
opportunities; “onshoring” of production back to the UK; and the increasing share of foreign ownership. The 
likely impacts of five pervasive and six secondary technologies are also spelt out, as well as the features of 
future factories, environmental trends and skills requirements. Several types of financial gaps are also 
identified. Based on this systemic view of the future of manufacturing, the final report thoroughly explores 
the policy implications of all these factors and trends. Rather than coming up with naïve suggestions 
based on simple trend extrapolation, it stresses the need to take an integrated view of value creation in 
manufacturing; follow a more targeted approach to supporting specific stages of manufacturing based on 
the value-chain approach, and a systemic understanding of STI (science, technology, and innovation) and 
industrial policies; and enhance government capability in evaluating and co-ordinating policy over the 
long term. 
Impact 
This project has not been evaluated yet. 
 
The most recent rounds of the Japanese national foresight programme have shifted from an 
exclusive technological focus to a broader approach, considering, for example, market, health, 
environmental, skills and ownership issues, too, when presenting a plan for the “Revitalization of Japanese Industry” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013, 2014). 
The US National Academy of Engineering (NAE) published a major report in 2015 taking a broad view of manufacturing: “Making Value for America: Embracing the Future of Manufacturing, 
 
7 The UK was among the frontrunners in Europe to use foresight, starting in the early 1990s. Given the 
lessons learnt, the aims, methods, and organisation of these activities changed whenever a new cycle was 
launched. The first cycle (1993-98) aimed at identifying S&T priorities for the entire UK research system. 
The second cycle (1999-2001) was concerned with promoting broader participation in dialogues on 
business-related issues, mobilising a wider variety of participants, and also broadening the issues 
considered, especially by putting more emphasis on quality of life. The third cycle (2002-present) 
significantly changed the scope of analysis to anticipate policy-relevant changes and identify how S&T can 
serve these direct, sharply-focused policy needs (e.g. to tackle flooding, cyber crime and obesity). It 
restricted the number of projects running at any one time to three to four, as well as the time available to 
complete a given project (12-18 months). It also became a precondition to have a committed sponsor, i.e. a 
high-ranking politician or policy-maker who is committed to take up the recommendations stemming 
from a given project. See Georghiou et al. (2010), Keenan and Miles (2008), and Miles (2005) for a 
thorough analysis of the UK foresight cycles. 
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Technology, and Work” (Donofrio and Whitefoot (eds), 2015). Unlike the UK foresight process 
on the future of manufacturing, it is based on the work of a smaller group of experts: a 
committee established by the NAE, staff members and contributions by fellow S&T experts. 
The Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) has been another important US initiative, 
launched by the president in 2011. Following a successful first stage, leading to several policy 
recommendations (PACST, 2012), its second stage (AMP2.0) was convened in September 2013, 
yielding further recommendations, published in a 2014 report (PACST, 2014). It has been 
followed up by a US government-funded initiative called “MForesight: Alliance for Manufacturing Foresight” (see Box 3). 
 
Box 3: US initiatives: The Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) and MForesight: 
Alliance for Manufacturing Foresight 
Background 
Acting upon the recommendation of his S&T advisers, the US president launched the Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) in 2011, a national effort bringing together businesses, universities, the 
federal government, and other stakeholders to identify emerging technologies with the potential to create 
high-quality domestic manufacturing jobs and enhance US global competitiveness. 
Process 
The AMP Steering Committee initiated five workstreams on technology development; shared 
infrastructure and facilities; education and workforce development; policy; and outreach, each with their 
own specific objectives. Background reports were produced on these themes. Extensive consultations 
with stakeholders were organised to identify opportunities for investments in advanced manufacturing 
that have the potential to transform US industry. Four regional meetings were conducted in different 
states, attended by 1 200 participants from industry and academia. The sixth background report 
summarised the main insights from these meetings. The second phase of AMP was convened in September 
2013. 
Outputs 
Two major reports were published by the AMP Steering Committee. The first, entitled “Capturing Domestic Competitive Advantage in Advanced Manufacturing” (PACST, 2012), focused on three pillars to 
create the necessary conditions for maintaining US leadership in advanced manufacturing: enabling 
innovation (six recommendations); securing the talent pipeline (six recommendations), and improving the business climate (four recommendations). The report’s recommendations included: developing a 
model for evaluating, prioritising, and recommending federal investments in advanced manufacturing technologies; public‐private partnerships, including the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation, to focus on advancing high‐impact technologies and models for collaboration that encompass technology 
development, innovation infrastructure, and workforce development; and public intervention to increase 
private investment in advancing manufacturing in the United States. The second report, entitled “Accelerating US Advanced Manufacturing” (PACST, 2014), also used the three 
pillars identified in phase 1 to organise its 11 recommendations. These were concerned with policy 
governance (devising a national plan on emerging manufacturing strategy and creating an advisory 
consortium, as well as a shared National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) governance structure); new public‐private manufacturing research and development (R&D) infrastructure; processes 
and standards (e.g. on interoperability of technologies and cyber security); changing the image of 
manufacturing to attract talents; education and skill development, as well as a system of nationally 
recognised, portable, and stackable skill certifications; improving the flow of information on technologies, 
markets and supply chains to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and reducing the risk associated with scaling up advance manufacturing technologies via the creation of a public‐private scale‐up investment fund, improved information flow between strategic partners, government and 
manufacturers, and tax incentives to foster manufacturing investments. A specific recommendation on 
implementation was also added, urging the National Economic Council and the Office of the S&T Policy to 
submit a set of recommendations to the president within 60 days. 
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Impact Following the recommendations of the first AMP report, “A National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing” was published in February 2012; the Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office 
(AMNPO) was formed as an inter-agency team to co-ordinate and collaborate on cross-cutting initiatives; 
federal funding for advanced manufacturing R&D was increased by nearly 20% in the 2013 fiscal year; 
pilot institutes were opened on advanced manufacturing; and the patent system was reformed. (Further 
impacts are reported in PACST, 2014.) 
As a specific impact, AMP has been followed up by a US government-funded initiative called “MForesight: Alliance for Manufacturing Foresight”. MForesight was established in 2015 and aims to “serve as the voice 
of the national advanced manufacturing community, providing government and industry with information 
and analyses about emerging technologies, workforce training, and opportunities for public-private partnerships that strengthen US competitiveness.” It has six main objectives: 1) identify and prioritise 
technologies worth developing and expanding; 2) prepare reports on emerging technologies for future 
investment; 3) identify and share success cases in technology commercialisation and workforce 
development; 4) communicate opportunities and challenges to business, government, and academic 
players in advanced manufacturing; 5) promote career opportunities in engineering and advanced 
manufacturing; and 6) share technology forecasting results to help the US manufacturing community stay 
ahead of the curve. These objectives are to be achieved by organising interactive public workshops, small 
expert gatherings, and virtual roundtables, publishing reports, articles, and conference presentations, as 
well as using social media. (For further details, see http://mforesight.org/about-us/) 
 
In summary, countries have applied a multitude of approaches and methods to identify and 
prepare for the opportunities and challenges that are likely to be raised by the next production 
revolution. Given the interrelatedness of technologies, new materials and processes, and new 
business models relevant to the next production revolution, a systemic approach to foresight 
seems more appropriate to inform next production revolution policies than a narrower S&T 
focus. Furthermore, participatory approaches enable various innovation and societal actors to 
bring together a much richer set of knowledge, experience, values, aspirations, perspectives and 
strategies to analyse the complex technological, economic, social, and potentially environmental 
changes that are expected. Yet, in certain cases, narrower expert-based projects have an 
important advantage: their results are normally produced more quickly and at a lower cost. 
 
 
3 Potential benefits of foresight and its roles in devising policies 
This section provides an overview of the potential benefits of foresight by considering its 
intended and unintended impacts and analyses six major possible roles for foresight in shaping 
and implementing policies. 
 
3.1 Potential benefits of foresight 
As shown by a range of studies (e.g. Havas et al., 2010; Cassingena Harper, 2016), foresight can 
help decision-makers cope with an uncertain future. Foresight can aid policy formation by 
generating reports that analyse the dynamics of change, future challenges and related options 
for action. Such analysis is used by policy-makers as input for issue definition, as well as for 
designing policies. This can provide the foundations for more robust policies, foster systems 
thinking, offer a new framing of policy issues, and turn long-term concerns into urgent policy 
priorities. Foresight can also play a role in making policy implementation more effective by 
facilitating the mobilisation and alignment of key stakeholders, and supporting policy co-
ordination. In this way, foresight can supplement traditional top-down policy instruments, by 
shaping the mindsets of those participating in the process, and thus preparing the ground for 
complementary actions and strategies. 
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For these benefits to materialise, foresight needs to achieve impacts in different terms: 
• in cognitive terms, to help prepare the mindsets of people for possible changes (new 
contexts, new socio-economic processes), which would require new ways of thinking; 
• in procedural terms, by contributing to a change in decision-preparation processes, for 
instance, by including more, and a wider set of, stakeholders; 
• in substantive terms, to actually change the content of policies; 
• in terms of structural and/or organisational changes. 
The benefits mentioned above correspond to the intended impacts of foresight, but it is far from 
certain that such intended impacts will actually be achieved. Some of the critical factors and 
conditions necessary to reap the benefits of foresight are discussed in the next section. 
Intended impacts also need to be seen against the backdrop of the policy governance system in 
which the foresight process is embedded. In essence, a foresight process can either reinforce the 
existing system of policy governance or contribute to transforming it. In this way, the 
appropriate design of a foresight process is dependent on prior problem perception. In 
particular, the frame of reference is key, that is, how the problem area is delineated and whether 
the existing policy governance sub-system, or other parts of the innovation system, are to be 
reinforced or transformed. 
In addition to the intended impacts, there can also be unintended impacts, which can be either 
positive or negative. Unintended impacts, by their very nature, can rarely be anticipated: they 
often arise from indirect and unknown pathways of influence. For instance, the changes in the 
mindset of policy-makers and other stakeholders, which a foresight activity have triggered, may 
help strengthening or building capabilities of strategic thinking that may be equally useful in 
other policy domains. The same can be said about new networks built and knowledge created. 
The widely known problem of attribution arises when identifying and interpreting the impacts 
of foresight. Other factors than a given foresight process also affect policies, and foresight may 
well just reinforce and integrate isolated initiatives that have been around for a while. As a 
consequence, it is often difficult to observe and measure foresight impacts in a precise way. The 
problem of attribution is particularly pertinent in relation to far-reaching impacts, such as, for 
instance, on economic performance. The pathways of influence are multifaceted and indirect, 
with many other factors coming into play. The timing of expected impacts is also an important 
consideration, since while some effects may be almost immediate, others may take a long time to 
arise.8 
Disentangling how impacts unfold is a challenging task (Georghiou and Keenan, 2006). In the 
foresight literature, it is often argued that the “process” benefits are (at least) as important as 
the “products”, that is, reports, lists of priorities, policy recommendations, roadmaps, etc. for 
achieving impacts (Amanatidou and Guy, 2008). This is because the process is more likely than 
any report to change the mindsets of decision-makers and help structure new networks 
(without denying the influence of well-written reports and policy recommendations).9 
 
3.2 Possible roles of foresight in shaping and implementing policies 
Providing the foundations for more robust policies 
Foresight explores different possible futures. In uncertain times, thinking in terms of multiple 
future states is a necessary precondition for devising policies to cope with unexpected 
developments. The Shell experience of the early 1970s is a well-known example: having 
considered an oil crisis as one of its possible futures, the company was better prepared than its 
 
8 For a more detailed account on possible intermediate and ultimate impacts, see, e.g. Havas et al. (2010).  
9 Process benefits can also occur in terms of improved decision-preparation processes, as well as more 
efficient structural and/or organisational set ups. 
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competitors to tackle this – until then an unthought-of – situation once it occurred (Jefferson, 
2012; Shell, 2013). Foresight can also make policies more robust by bringing together into policy 
dialogues participants with diverse backgrounds, in order to tap into their wide-ranging 
accumulated knowledge, complementary experiences, aspirations and ideas. For example, the 
Finnish governmental foresight report on “Long-term Climate and Energy Policy: Towards a 
Low-carbon Finland” (2009) used a participatory process involving stakeholders with diverse 
backgrounds and interests to explore four different scenarios that showed various pathways 
towards a low-carbon Finland, with each pointing to different implications for industry, 
consumers and government. Ultimately, the project triggered a dialogue between the 
government and the parliament on the future of the country and provided a foundation for 
policy strategies stretching beyond parliamentary cycles. 
Fostering systems thinking 
In a complex world, phenomena cannot be understood in an isolated manner, but must be seen 
in context, taking into account a range of different viewpoints. Foresight, on account of its 
participatory nature, and drawing on relevant methods, is a means to incorporate different 
perspectives when exploring possible futures and to bring to the fore a range of relevant 
influences on, and impacts of, the issue in question. The recent British foresight project on “The Future of Manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK” provides a good 
example of this. It considers several factors shaping the key future characteristics of 
manufacturing by looking ahead to 2050 (see Box 2). Based on this systemic view of the future 
of manufacturing, the report thoroughly explores the policy implications of all these factors and 
trends. It stresses the need to take an integrated view of value creation in manufacturing; follow 
a more targeted approach to supporting specific stages of manufacturing based on the value-
chain approach and a systemic understanding of STI (science, technology and innovation) 
policies, as well as industrial policies; and enhance government capabilities in evaluating and co-
ordinating policy over the long term. The process itself can also have systemic impacts, with 
intense dialogues strengthening existing, or creating new, networks of major actors, and 
reinforcing a future-oriented way of thinking. The novel, participatory methods used in foresight 
can also reshape the overall culture of policy-making, especially in the domains of education, 
industrial, and innovation policies. 
The US AMP project has also taken a systemic view, stressing the importance of governance 
structures, processes and standards, skill formation and recognition, financial and other factors 
constraining investments in advanced technologies, strategy-making capabilities of SMEs, and 
networking among strategic partners (see Box 3). Similarly, “Making Value for America: Embracing the Future of Manufacturing, Technology, and Work” (Donofrio and Whitefoot (eds), 
2015) has also considered manufacturing in its broader context, as has the study “Revitalization 
of Japanese Industry” (prime minister’s office, 2013, 2014). 
New framing of policy issues 
Government bodies tend to be organised along the lines of well-established, and rigidly 
demarcated, policy domains. In such an environment it is often difficult to find an appropriate 
place for cross-cutting research domains or new modes of delimiting them (e.g. shifting from 
S&T-led to societal challenge-driven research and innovation projects). Foresight processes 
have the potential to change not only the framing of policy issues, but also to induce 
organisational innovations. 
The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Foresight is a case in point (see 
Box 4): it aimed to identify new focal areas in research, defining cross-cutting issues and 
interdisciplinary topics that require attention. Two of these novel future fields were called „Human-Technology Co-operation” and “ProductionConsumption 2.0”. Both fields obtained high 
visibility in policy debates and triggered an intense discussion about the future of manufacturing 
in Germany, eventually contributing to and shaping the concept of what is nowadays called 
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“Industrie 4.0”. One of the fields was subsequently also mirrored in the creation of a new 
division in BMBF in 2010, called “Demographic Change and Human-Technology Co-operation”. 
 
Box 4: BMBF Foresight, Germany 
Background 
The German BMBF Foresight was launched in 2007, with a follow-up in 2012. It builds on earlier foresight 
activities of BMBF using different methods (Key Technologies, Delphi, FUTUR Process). The BMBF 
Foresight needs to be viewed in the context of the German High-tech Strategy (aiming to concentrate 
research efforts on areas of future promise) and the Excellence Initiative (providing top-up funding to 
leading universities and research centres). The main objectives of the 2007 round were as follows: 
• identify new focal areas in research and technology that the BMBF should address; 
• define cross-cutting issues and interdisciplinary topics that require broader attention; 
• help forge strategic partnerships of various departments within the ministry and different groups of 
actors in the innovation system, who are able to jointly address the areas and topics identified in a 
strategic manner; and 
• propose priorities for concrete measures to be adopted to promote the fields in question. 
Process 
The BMBF Foresight, co-ordinated by a team of external experts, employed a combination of analytical 
and exploratory methods, ranging from expert surveys and participation in critical reflection rounds, to 
the co-shaping of policy advice. In a first, largely analytical phase, an overview of emerging future topics 
was produced. It was subsequently consolidated by an on-line Delphi survey and followed by a series of 
workshops, designed to deliver the necessary “sense-making”. The process delivered 14 future research 
and innovation topics and 7 cross-cutting future fields. Suggestions were also made regarding actors to be 
involved, partnerships to be formed, and actions to be taken. 
Outputs 
The outputs of the BMBF Foresight were compiled in a set of main reports: Cuhls et al. (eds) (2009a), 
(2009b). 
Impact 
One of the most visible cross-cutting fields was ProductionConsumption 2.0, which integrates future 
technological and social changes along the entire production-consumption chain. While the future topics could be integrated rather easily in the ministry’s strategy and policies, in particular the High-tech 
Strategy, it was much more difficult to integrate the cross-cutting fields. Addressing cross-cutting issues is 
difficult in an environment of demarcated terrains of S&T fields and a rather monolithic culture with 
limited openness to interdisciplinary approaches. 
However, the embedding of highly innovative cross-cutting future fields in a process that offers also a number of “quick wins” in terms of more traditional research and innovation topics may have been a wise 
approach. It allowed infusing some non-conventional insights into a context that was otherwise mainly 
receptive to conventional research and innovation topics. 
Critical factors 
The BMBF Foresight was successful in avoiding the fate of several foresight projects in other countries 
where changes in government significantly reduced the chances of foresight results being taken up by the 
incoming government. By preparing emerging topics with a significant potential for exploitation, sufficient 
room was left for political choices in different kinds of strategy formation processes. 
Moreover, dedicated efforts to interact closely with the sponsors of the BMBF Foresight were an integral 
part of project design. The foresight team was expected to engage intensely with different interested 
departments in the BMBF. This interaction may have been a meandering in search for and discovery of 
new topics, but it strengthened the interactions and debates within and across government departments. 
Finally, even the less exploited results of BMBF Foresight turned out to be a valuable resource for 
subsequent policy-making, because they served as an “information reservoir” for further systemic change. 
In the meantime, experiences have been accumulated in public administration on how to make effective 
use of foresight, and if the process is continued on a regular basis, as is planned, then the reservoir fields 
identified in the different rounds may get reinforced during the next cycle(s). 
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Turning long-term concerns into urgent policy priorities 
Agenda setting is about deciding which policy issues deserve most attention. Priority issues 
need to be identified, selected in a justified manner, and specified. Whether or not a problem is 
moved onto the policy agenda is a matter of the perceived urgency of the issue, and of the 
perception that government action may be necessary to tackle it. 
Foresight can play a beneficial role for agenda setting in several regards, by making transparent 
why a seemingly long-term issue may require immediate policy attention. First of all, by focusing 
debates on the long-term, it contributes to changing the perception of longer-term issues and 
allows turning them into urgent ones. In this way, foresight can be a means to make explicit why 
long-term issues need to be treated with urgency on today’s policy agendas.  
Second, and related to the long-term perspective inherent to foresight, novel future-oriented 
rationales to underpin and justify policy interventions can be developed in the context of 
foresight, providing arguments justifying government intervention. In the case of the Finnish 
governmental foresight reports, this effect is enabled and reinforced by the dialogue between 
the parliament and government in developing the reports. Issues of a longer-term nature (e.g. 
climate change, competitiveness and well-being in society) were positioned high on the policy 
agenda due to the prominence of the corresponding government foresight reports, together with 
the underlying rationales to justify that positioning. 
Finally, visions often play an important supporting role in making long-term issues more 
palpable, because they serve as sources of inspiration and orientation for prioritisation and 
underlying rationales (see Box 5 for examples). While they may have, in the first instance, an 
influence on the mindsets of individual policy-makers and stakeholders, they also provide novel 
and powerful ideas for the formulation of rationales to legitimise and justify priorities and scope 
for government intervention, and can thus strengthen the credibility of policy agendas. 
 
Box 5: Manufacturing visions 
United Kingdom “Constant adaptability will pervade all aspects of manufacturing, from research and development to 
innovation, production processes, supplier and customer interdependencies, and lifetime product 
maintenance and repair. Products and processes will be sustainable, with built-in reuse, remanufacturing 
and recycling for products reaching the end of their useful lives. Closed loop systems will be used to eliminate energy and water waste and to recycle physical waste.” (excerpt from “A new vision for UK manufacturing” presented in GOS 2013, p. 6) 
United States “A new generation of networked-based information technologies, data analytics and predictive modeling 
is providing unprecedented capabilities as well as access to previously unimagined potential uses of data 
and information not only in the advancement of new physical technologies, materials and products but also the advancement of new, radically better ways of doing manufacturing. (…) Our vision is that such 
integration via ASCPM will increase productivity, product and process agility, environmental 
sustainability, energy and raw material usage, and safety performance as well as economic performance – 
and thereby comprehensively improve the competitiveness of U.S. factories of varied sizes and 
complexity. In particular, broader application of ASCPM technologies has great potential in energy‐intensive manufacturing, and integral to use of big data analytics to drive manufacturing decisions. (…) 
Visualization, Informatics, & Digital Manufacturing (VIDM) is a set of integrated, crosscutting enterprise‐level smart‐manufacturing approaches, leveraging the current advances in information technology systems and tools that will improve U.S. manufacturing competitiveness through end‐to‐end supply‐chain efficiency, unprecedented flexibility, and optimized energy management to achieve error‐free manufacturing of customized products and components from digital designs, when needed and where needed. (…) Our vision is that VIDM (…) will rapidly change the way manufacturers use and 
exchange information to plan, support, source, deliver, and make commercial products in the U.S. (…) 
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Our vision is that the U.S. will train a workforce that can invent, adapt, maintain, and recycle materials 
critical to U.S. infrastructure, defense, medical care, and quality-of-life. This vision will also accelerate the transition from lower to higher TRL/MRL maturity, to enable faster and broader industry adoption.” (excerpts from “Accelerating U.S. Advanced Manufacturing”, PCAST, 2014, pp. 67-70) 
 
Facilitating the mobilisation and alignment of key stakeholders 
Besides exploring possible futures, most foresight activities also aim to achieve a common 
understanding of what a desirable future might be. Such visions and, associated to them, more 
operational roadmaps, can be powerful instruments to assemble different key players in a 
domain around a shared agenda. The main benefit of such visions, roadmaps and strategic 
agendas is that they help reduce uncertainty about the ambitions of partners and competitors, 
and thus assist making long-term investment decisions. Moreover, once participants arrive at a 
shared vision, they can expect that most of their fellow participants would take steps to achieve 
that chosen future state, and thus align their future actions to the jointly identified favourable 
future. The first attempt to develop such shared visions for manufacturing at an EU level was the 
FutMan project (“Future of manufacturing in Europe 2015-20 – the challenge for sustainable 
development“), carried out in 2001-03 (Geyer et al., 2003). By way of scenario development, it 
explored different images and pathways of the future of manufacturing, as well as building 
blocks of a joint EU vision. Interestingly, it rightly anticipated new technological developments, 
such as additive manufacturing (3D printing). Results from FutMan nurtured the formation of 
the MANUFUTURE European technology platform, which brought together the main 
stakeholders from academia and industry. The MANUFUTURE vision and strategic research 
agenda was further underpinned by the follow-up project to FutMan, called ManVis. 
Supporting policy co-ordination 
Foresight usually aims to identify future issues that often cut across established areas of policy 
interest. By way of involving participants from different policy domains that are likely to be 
affected by these novel developments, a futures dialogue can be initiated across the boundaries 
of these fields. This can be a dialogue that contributes to creating a shared perception of 
emerging challenges, and complementary, if not joint, strategies to address them. Policy co-
ordination can be fostered both horizontally (i.e. across policy domains, or between the 
parliament and government) and vertically (i.e. between ministries and executive agencies). The 
FinnSight 2015 project, conducted in 2006, illustrates both effects (see Box 6). Its focus was on 
the change factors that had significant impacts on Finnish business and society, and on the 
identification of areas of expertise that would foster well-being and competitiveness. FinnSight 
2015 informed the dialogue between the government and parliament on these issues. Moreover, 
its results were not only taken up by the two implementing organisations, that is, the Academy 
of Finland and Tekes, the National Technology Agency of Finland, in their respective strategy 
development, but were also important for the subsequent establishment of Strategic Centres for 
Science, Technology and Innovation (e.g. CLEEN Oy, the energy and environment cluster). 
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Box 6: Governmental Foresight Reports Finland – Finnsight 2015 
Background The Finnish Governmental Foresight Reports have been prepared by the Prime Minister’s Office and a 
dedicated task force since 1992. These reports are debated in government, then presented and discussed 
in the Finnish Parliament in the second year of each parliamentary term. The 2006 edition of the 
governmental foresight Report – FinnSight 2015 – was dedicated to industrial futures. FinnSight 2015 
aimed at identifying future change factors and challenges of research and innovation activities, and 
analysed the areas of expertise that would foster well-being in society and the competitiveness of 
businesses by means of scientific research and innovation activities (Academy of Finland and Tekes, 
2006). 
Process 
FinnSight 2015 was jointly implemented by the Academy of Finland and Tekes. It focused on the change 
factors that may impact on Finnish business and industry as well as Finnish society on a time horizon of 
2015, mapped them with current areas of competence in Finland, and suggested areas for future building 
of focal competence areas. It drew mainly on the work of ten sectoral expert panels, with representatives 
from business and civic organisations. The panels engaged in qualitative exploration of change factors, as 
well as in semi-quantitative online assessments. Cross-panel interactions enabled the identification of 
cross-cutting areas. 
Outputs 
The main output of the project was a major report to the Parliament (Academy of Finland and Tekes, 
2006), which served as a basis for parliamentary debates, but also fuelled public debates and strategic 
thinking in Finnish companies and clusters. 
Impact 
These governmental foresight reports provide an opportunity to move future issues onto the policy 
agenda. This happens directly when the reports are taken up in parliamentary and/or public policy 
debates (and indirectly, when foresight experts contribute to the preparation of the reports). Although it 
is hard to confirm a direct influence on policy-making, there are indications that recent Governmental 
Foresight Reports have enhanced the awareness and importance of futures thinking in Finland. The 
institutionalised nature of the reports, the backing from the highest level of the government and the 
Parliament, the methodological soundness, as well as the wide outreach to the best knowledge available in 
the country all contribute to enhancing their influence on agenda setting. Given the high-level status of the 
reports, they also help ensure the continuity of agendas in the course of the shift from one government to 
the next. 
These reports also exert an influence outside of government. FinnSight 2015, for instance, has been 
important for the establishment of Strategic Centrers for Science, Technology and Innovation. Results 
have also been used to reinforce strategy work at the Academy of Finland and Tekes. 
Critical factors 
Finland is a country with a well-developed foresight culture, including a high absorptive capacity for 
foresight. A governmental foresight network connects the many government departments and public 
agencies with dedicated foresight units, which conduct foresight on a regular basis. There is also a sound 
awareness of the main barriers and pitfalls associated with government-led foresight processes, and great 
care is taken to address them, including: 
• information overload due to open and shared information; 
• resistance to making foresight material publicly available; 
• excessive bureaucratic effort leading to unwillingness to engage; 
• failure to identify suitable experts and engage with them; 
• poor quality of source material and analyses; 
• inconsistent process design; 
• insufficient continuity of interactions with users of foresight results; 
• lack of need for foresight perceived by society. 
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3.3 Transforming the policy governance and other sub-systems 
Besides shaping policies, informing, advising and implementing policies as discussed above, 
foresight can also play a role at a systemic level. Thus, it is worth digging one layer deeper by 
considering if a foresight process is aimed at strengthening an existing innovation system (or 
any of its major sub-system, including the policy governance sub-system) or on the contrary, at 
reconfiguring it. In other words, another major potential role of foresight in shaping the new 
production revolution is transforming the industrial and innovation policy governance sub-
systems and other parts of an innovation system. 
Foresight offers opportunities for reflexive learning in a given policy domain. As a result, 
participants might conclude that the prevailing perspectives on policy issues and/or the 
configuration of the policy governance sub-system may be inadequate to address the economic, 
societal or environmental challenges they are facing. They can also recognise that the predominant “silo-thinking” in government circles hinders the orchestration of various policy 
actions that need to be aligned to be capable of effectively tackling major issues. 
These insights can lead to the reconfiguration of the policy governance sub-system, or to be 
more modest, initiate further reflections concerning the adequacy of the configuration of a 
current policy governance sub-system to address systemic issues (e.g. the emergence of new 
RTDI practices and the evolution of new innovation ecosystems, also characterised by new 
business models.10 
 
3.4 Summary of benefits and impacts 
In summary, foresight can influence innovation activities and hence economic performance 
through a web of direct and indirect impacts. Through its process benefits and products (e.g. 
reports, visions, recommendations, roadmaps) it is likely to shape policy-making. However, 
given the complexity of the pathways of influence – indicated by the sheer number and diversity 
of actors involved in a foresight process and subsequent policy formation – it would be a rather 
demanding task to establish a clear and direct link between an actual foresight process and its 
impacts on policies. It is further complicated by indirect impacts on innovation and economic 
activities and performance, structural changes, and ways of thinking and behaviour of the major 
actors of an innovation system. 
Furthermore, the potential roles and expected impacts will vary by type of prospective analyses. 
Participatory processes mobilise a wider set of knowledge, experience, aspirations and world 
views compared to an expert-based project. Hence, more novel and unconventional ideas can be 
expected, which can be better substantiated given the diversity of viewpoints, since ideas would 
be more thoroughly tested and contested from various angles. Furthermore, a deeper, more 
thorough understanding of major long-term challenges and their social, environmental and 
economic repercussions is more likely to stem from participatory processes. Policies, therefore, 
would be better substantiated and their credibility and legitimation strengthened. A wider set of 
policies could be more consciously orchestrated, increasing the effectiveness of their 
implementation. 
Clearly, prospective analysis focusing on innovation and manufacturing systems would consider 
a broader set of issues than S&T centred projects, with benefits for both policy preparation and 
implementation. Given the complex issues – interrelated technological, economic, societal and 
environmental opportunities and challenges – brought about by the next production revolution, 
a systemic approach seems to be more appropriate as a foundation for devising policies aimed at 
tackling these far-reaching and profound changes. The country case boxes featured in this 
 
10 Main features of various types of STI policy governance sub-systems and the conditions for a successful 
transformative foresight process are analysed in detail in Havas and Weber (2017), illustrated by actual 
cases. 
  18 
chapter bear this out. Yet, in certain contexts, an S&T centred prospective analysis can also be 
useful, but it should be clear from the outset that different and only more limited benefits and 
impacts can arise from this approach. 
 
 
4 Factors and conditions critical to reaping the benefits of foresight 
This section considers the most important factors to keep in mind to reap the benefits of 
foresight. These include chiefly political and policy factors (4.1–4.5), as well as various 
methodological considerations (4.6–4.8). 
 
4.1 A committed client and clear objectives 
Both successful and less successful foresight projects point to the same major conclusion: a 
fundamental condition for achieving impact is to have a committed client, that is, an organisation 
or a set of organisations with decision-making competences, that would be open to the 
recommendations stemming from the foresight process and willing to act upon these proposals 
(including acting as a “foresight champion” in case other bodies need to be involved in making 
decisions). Without this sort of commitment, much of the time and effort participants put into a 
foresight process would be wasted, together with the public money spent to cover 
organisational and other costs. By way of example, the second cycle of the UK foresight 
programme (1999-2001) had weak impacts for two main reasons: it had too many projects 
running without a clear focus; and it lacked clients – or project “owners” – who felt a strong 
need to tackle a perceived policy problem through a foresight process. Learning from this 
experience, the third cycle, launched in 2002 and still on-going, has only three to four parallel 
projects running at any one time, and all these have a “sponsoring” minister, who usually chairs 
the stakeholder group overseeing the project. The sponsoring minister, therefore, feels 
ownership and is willing to take up the proposals stemming from the project. Equally good ideas, 
developed without his or her active involvement, might well be perceived as recommendations 
by “aliens”, and would probably have a lower chance of implementation (see Box 2). 
A coherent project plan should also be devised in close co-operation with the client(s) to 
determine foresight’s focus, main objectives, time horizon, geographic scope, and the choice of 
appropriate participants and methods. 
 
4.2 Continued support and sustained efforts over time 
Continued support is needed to reap the benefits of foresight activities: it takes quite some time – 
often several rounds of activities – to affect policies, ways of thinking, policy-making cultures 
and governance systems. For instance, the project on ”The Future of Manufacturing: A new era 
of opportunity and challenge for the UK” lasted for two years and required significant resources 
(see Box 2). In other cases, a succession of projects was needed: the European MANUFUTURE 
technology platform has capitalised on the results of FutMan and ManVis (both mentioned 
above) when defining its vision and strategic research agenda. The MANUFUTURE technology 
platform has played a role in “moulding” the manufacturing elements of the European Union’s 
Research and Technological Development (EU RTD) Framework Programmes towards a new 
manufacturing paradigm. The Seventh Framework Programme and Horizon 2020 would have 
evolved differently in the absence of the ManVis and FutMan projects. These strategic dialogues 
are facilitated now by the Intelligent Manufacturing Systems project, spanning three continents 
(http://www.ims.org; see also Cagnin and Konnola [2014]). 
In those countries where national foresight programmes were one-off initiatives (e.g. Greece and 
Hungary), the opportunities to reap the benefits – as well as for “learning by doing” – have been 
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severely constrained. This contrasts with the situation in those countries that have conducted 
several foresight cycles over many years (e.g. Germany, Japan, the UK; see Boxes 2 and 4).11 
 
4.3 Learning by doing to absorb insights 
Foresight is still a new, unconventional way of thinking, communicating and preparing strategic 
actions in many countries, and thus learning about foresight is crucial. Readily available reports 
on actual cases, together with methodological guidelines, would certainly help policy-makers, 
foresight practitioners, stakeholders (as potential participants) and opinion-leaders better 
understand and assess the relevance of foresight, but deep learning can only occur through 
practice. As there is no single blueprint for a “perfect” foresight process, on the one hand, and 
the challenges to be tackled and the opportunities to be exploited constantly evolve, on the other, 
this learning process is particularly important. It is forcefully illustrated by the major changes 
introduced in the third cycle of UK foresight (see Box 2). Another telling example is the Japanese 
national foresight programme, whose most recent rounds have shifted from an exclusive 
technological focus in the 1970s and 1980s to a broader socio-technical approach. This shift 
reflects changing perceptions in Japan of the relationship between technology and society. 
 
4.4 Supportive organisational and political cultures 
The ultimate condition for high-quality and useful foresight is having a deeply rooted foresight 
culture in place. Nurturing foresight culture is a lengthy and demanding process, which cannot 
be planned in advance by setting deadlines and milestones. Continued support to foresight, 
together with the ensuing learning process, is necessary to this end. For example, since 1992, the 
Finnish government, under the responsibility of the Prime Minister’s Office and supported by 
external partners, has prepared a foresight report to the Finnish Parliament once per 
parliamentary term. These reports have strengthened long-term thinking in Finland, created a 
dialogue between government and parliament on future issues of national relevance, and 
provided a stable strategic framework for policy that goes way beyond election cycles (see Box 
6). In contrast, changes in government have prevented the continuation of national foresight 
programmes, and thus the creation of a foresight culture, in countries like Greece, Hungary, and 
Turkey. 
 
4.5 Close links to decision-making – but with intellectual autonomy 
In some cases, countries have conducted foresight for its own sake – because “we are at least as 
smart as our neighbours”, or it has been promoted by international organisations. To make 
foresight useful, it should be embedded in the decision-making system (see Boxes 2 and 6). Its 
timing, relevance to major issues faced by a given society, and co-ordination with other 
significant policy initiatives are critical. The German BMBF Foresight (2007-09) explored future 
issues and challenges to underpin German STI policy, and was closely connected to the German 
High-tech Strategy. In this way, new focal areas in research and technology were identified, 
defining cross-cutting issues and interdisciplinary topics that require attention. This co-
ordination also helped forging strategic partnerships within BMBF and with actors of the 
German innovation system (see Box 4). 
It is also important to find an organisational set-up that can ease the inherent contradiction 
between the need for foresight to be embedded in the decision-making system (to gain political 
 
11 For a concise overview of some of these country cases see e.g. Havas and Weber (2017), for more 
detailed analyses consult e.g. Amanatidou (2013), (2014); Cuhls (2013); Cuhls and Georghiou (2004); 
Cuhls et al. (2009); Georghiou et al. (2010), Georghiou and Keenan (2006); Havas (2003), Keenan and 
Miles (2009); Kuwahara (1999); Martin and Johnston (1999); Miles (2005); NISTEP (2005); OECD (1996); 
and Yokoo and Okuwada (2012). 
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support), and the need to maintain intellectual autonomy (to facilitate original thinking). It is not 
a trivial task to strike a balance between these requirements, and any solution can only be 
context-specific. For example, given the legacy of central planning, especially its all-pervasive 
hierarchical features, it was decided that TEP, the Hungarian Technology Foresight Programme 
(1998-2000), should be driven by its participants rather than by the government agency that 
initiated and financed it, and that the programme should enjoy a high level of autonomy. Even 
with these features, some of the participants perceived foresight at the beginning of the process 
as central planning in disguise. TEP, therefore, was not embedded in decision-making structures. 
Moreover, the government agency that launched TEP did not have the necessary political clout 
to convince the major ministries to act upon the policy proposals produced by TEP. The change 
in government during the lifetime of TEP was also unfavourable (Havas, 2003). Thus, only a few 
recommendations have been implemented in a slow and non-linear process (Georghiou et al., 
2004). 
 
4.6 The chosen type of foresight and its main objectives need to “fit” the purpose 
For foresight to be effective, it is important to consider the relationship between its design (in 
terms of focus, methods and level of participation), on the one hand, and characteristics of the 
policy governance sub- system (especially the existing decision-making culture and methods; 
the commitment of decision-makers to rely on the results; the availability of methodological 
skills and experience; the level of capabilities for strategic thinking) in which it is supposed to be 
embedded, on the other. In many cases, a foresight process needs to resonate with the prevailing 
policy governance sub-system to be effective, that is, it needs to be compatible with the culture 
of participation and respect fundamental institutional and organisational boundaries (e.g. in 
terms of being restricted to a single policy area rather than being cross-cutting in nature). This is 
usually the case in foresight activities that aim to set thematic priorities, but without questioning 
the structural and institutional conditions in a given area. 
However, foresight processes that aim to set thematic priorities need to be clearly distinguished 
from those that aim to induce systemic change (Havas and Weber, 2017). This is a crucial 
distinction in the context of the next production revolution, given the necessity for fundamental 
changes in organisational structures, institutions and relations, thus pointing to a need to also 
question major elements of the system of policy governance. In such cases, it is more suitable to 
design a transformative foresight that contribute to changing the policy governance sub-system. 
This argument also shows that prior to the design of a foresight process, one needs to have a 
reasonably good preconception of the magnitude of the challenges ahead, that is, when defining 
the scope and purpose of the foresight. 
 
4.7 Facilitate the use of foresight recommendations 
Foresight products should be tailored to the needs (and language, communication modes) of 
intended audiences. For instance, short and concise policy briefs for high-level decision-makers 
need to be backed up by solid analytical and exploratory reports. The use of social media for 
diffusing foresight results may be equally important if the wider public is the main target 
audience. Tailoring foresight results to specific audiences requires specific skills, for instance in 
terms of translating results into policy briefs. 
Very often, the importance of the process of foresight is stressed as delivering additional 
benefits in terms of networking, mobilisation and strategic co-ordination among participants, 
but the process is also an important channel to facilitate the use and uptake of foresight recommendations. The participants in the process are best suited to serve as “ambassadors” of 
the foresight results, in particular when equipped with the right means and “products” to bring 
the results to bear in their own organisations (Jarmai, 2015). 
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Enabling the effective use of foresight in decision-making requires good embedding in the 
organisation (EFFLA, 2012). This embedding has several important facets, including 
organisational structures and responsibilities (Who is in charge?), the role of foresight in 
decision-making processes (When does it matter in decision-making?), the “futures literacy” of 
staff members in handling and interpreting foresight activities (Who is competent?) and the 
access to and exchange with internal and external networks/hubs of foresight knowledge (How 
can foresight knowledge be sourced?). 
 
4.8 Managing a foresight process 
The design and management of a foresight process needs to take into account all the 
aforementioned aspects, but in particular: (i) to embed foresight in decision-making structures, 
while maintaining intellectual autonomy; and (ii) the appropriate selection of the main approach, 
participants and methods. Furthermore, it is key to design and implement a communication 
strategy, tailored to the overall objective and the main target audience (policy-makers only 
versus major stakeholders, civil society organisations and the public at large). 
The overall context – in particular the decision-making culture and methods, as well as the 
availability of the relevant methodological skills and experience – would determine (i) where to 
locate the management unit, and (ii) what roles and responsibilities to assign to external experts, 
facilitators, and foresight practitioners. 
As in the case of any project financed by public funds, the operational aspects – planning an 
adequate budget and then respecting the financial limits, setting appropriate milestones, and 
keeping to deadlines – are of crucial importance. What is peculiar to a foresight process is the 
requirement of maintaining a certain degree of flexibility, too. In many cases, the originally 
identified policy needs, and hence the objectives to be served by the process, are evolving as a 
result of the process itself: participants arrive at a better understanding of the current situation 
and of future needs, opportunities and challenges on account of their intense, systematic 
dialogue, mobilising a diverse set of skills, knowledge, and experience. This means a careful 
balancing act is needed between two, somewhat contradictory requirements: to set clear 
objectives, on the one hand, and keep some room for flexibility, on the other, without 
jeopardising the timely completion of the process. 
 
 
5 Main policy and organisational lessons 
The systemic view of manufacturing has confirmed that successful innovation processes exploit 
many different types of knowledge. These pieces of knowledge are generated by various actors 
and activities, and hence rarely – if ever – are available inside a single organisation. It is, 
therefore, a major policy task to support the generation, diffusion and exploitation of all types of 
knowledge, as well as various types of collaborative efforts among different types of partners, 
across sectors, countries and world regions. The blurring boundaries between manufacturing 
and services reinforce this conclusion. 
The cases considered above show that foresight, if applied and exploited in an appropriate way, 
could support policy-making at times of rapid technological and socio-economic change. It does 
this not only by studying how the future might evolve, but also by representing an intervention 
itself. With the help of participatory methods, key actors and stakeholders are mobilised to form 
shared views about the future, negotiate their future stakes and interests, and agree on joint and 
coherent actions. These benefits arise also for government, where the emergence of new 
challenges requires better adjustments and orchestration between different policy domains 
affecting emerging areas of concern or opportunity, including, among others, the new 
production paradigm. 
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To reap these potential benefits of foresight, several preconditions need to be created: 
• It is essential to embed foresight appropriately in decision-making processes to make it 
effective. This requires changes to both organisational structures and strategy formation 
processes (see Box 2). 
• Foresight processes need to be orchestrated with policy cycles to ensure that futures 
intelligence is available at the right moment in time. 
• Foresight is about more than delivering a report. The participatory elements of foresight are 
demanding in terms of both time and resources, but they cannot be spared: the interactions 
among stakeholders and decision-makers are essential for triggering change processes in 
policy governance, society and economy. 
• A sustained effort is needed to create the competences and a conducive environment for 
conducting foresight effectively and efficiently. One-off exercises are unlikely to yield the 
expected impacts on policy-making. It takes time, and possibly specific measures, to nurture 
and widely diffuse future-oriented thinking. 
• Some form of institutionalisation – through regular programmes and/or the establishment of 
dedicated organisations – is needed to create a foresight culture and thus exploit its benefits 
in a sustained manner. As electoral cycles tend to be significantly shorter than the time 
horizon of the issues considered by foresight, this condition is of particular importance. 
• Without intellectual autonomy in developing new insights, foresight could not fulfil its key 
function of pointing to major emerging challenges and opportunities and novel ways to 
address them. 
• Context – in particular the perceived policy needs, the overall decision-making culture, and 
the domain to be analysed and subsequently shaped – not only matters, but is decisive when 
planning and conducting a foresight process. A general blueprint for devising and running a 
foresight process, therefore, would not fit anyone’s needs. Learning from experience of others 
is highly beneficial, but it would be a great mistake to search for a “one-size-fits-all” guide or copy any country’s practices, regardless of how successful a certain methodological and 
organisational model has been in that country. 
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